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MANFIELD

Topics for August 21, 1972 Meeting

1. HAK Japan Trip

- Concentrated on Hawaii meeting.
- We made clear that we will not interfere in Sino-Japanese normalization process and that pace is up to you two. (In this regard, we appreciated the Chinese message of August 14 concerning U. S. -Japanese relations).
- Much time was spent on economic and other bilateral issues. Also Asia, including Korea where we both favor increased communication and reduced tensions.

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

2. Paris and Saigon Visits

- We are making serious effort to conclude a settlement. Elections will not affect us one way or the other.
- We made counter-proposals on all but political question. On latter we held extensive talks with Thieu in effort to reach compromise solution.
- Next meeting is September 15 at which we will make serious political proposals. If Hanoi will reciprocate and meet us on middle ground, we can move toward a settlement.
- There have been press reports that Secretary Rogers implicated other nations in the search for a negotiated settlement. General

Haig called Mrs. Shih yesterday about this. Secretary Rogers was

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quoted out of context. We will do nothing to embarrass Hanoi's friends. Such stories will be shut off to the maximum extent possible. (We cannot control our press completely.)

3. September Trip

- I mentioned to Prime Minister in June the possibility of a trip to the USSR which the Russians have been proposing to follow up the Summit.
- We have now informed Moscow that I will go September 11-13/14.
- This is highly confidential until an announcement around September 5.
- We will continue to keep you meticulously informed.
- We will concentrate on bilateral issues such as where we go from here in SALT; the whole range of economic issues; European Security Conference and MBFR.

4. Nuclear Understanding

[FYI: Chinese August 14 note attacked agreement between U.S. and USSR or among all nuclear countries as being "impermissible." They reiterated position: "The Chinese side has consistently stood for the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through consultations by all countries and as a first step, reaching an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Not only should nuclear countries not use nuclear weapons.

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against each other, but what is more important, nuclear countries should not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. Only such an agreement will be just and can really solve the problem."

On August 14 Huang reiterated Chinese opposition and said that it could not agree with the formula the U.S. is considering as outlined by HAK on August 4. This subject is clipped in attached memcons of August 4 and [4.]

-- We will also be discussing nuclear understanding issue. We have studied Chinese comments of August 4 and 14 with great care. We have also sent them text of Soviet proposal.

-- We have noted Chinese view that as a first step, we should move in direction of non-use by all nations rather than any bilateral undertakings or agreement among nuclear countries alone.

-- As Chinese side knows, our objective has been to deprive document of any substantive significance by rendering it general and bland.

-- We will continue this effort, keeping firmly in mind the Chinese position. We are specifically trying to turn the draft in the direction of general abstention from the use of nuclear weapons.

-- We will continue to keep you fully informed.

5. Munich Stop

-- On the way to Moscow I will stop in Munich to talk with Chancellor Brandt. This will give me an opportunity to tell him directly (i. e.

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not through Bahr) that we favor the normalization of Sino-German relations.

6. Korea-UN

-- We have carefully considered the Chinese position on the UN debate on Korea, including the message Ambassador Huang conveyed on August 4, 1972.

-- As Ambassador Bush subsequently conveyed to the Ambassador, our position will remain that we should defer debate on this issue so as not to complicate efforts by the Koreans themselves and avoid confrontation.

7. Intelsat

[FYI: Holdridge has told Bromley Smith to tell State to tell Comsat to change its listing of earth stations to China (Shanghai) and China (Taiwan). This will be done, with the White House hand not showing if possible. We don't know how long this will take. A few days before the listing change, State will notify Ambassador Shen.]

-- We are continuing to work on the Intelsat listing of earth stations.

-- We are confident we will find a solution, but as already pointed out, our indirect methods require a little time.

8. Nelson Gross and Narcotics

[FYI: Enclosed cable reports on Gross meeting with the PRC Deputy Permanent Representative Wang.]

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9. HAK Travel Plans

- Miami tomorrow. Then San Clemente (plus Hawaii) returning around September 5.
- Other contacts will also be out of town (Haig, Lord, Howe, Rodman).
- You should call us through White House switchboard (202-456-1414) to San Clemente with any urgent message.
- If you need to deliver a message, we will send a communicator from our Situation Room. He handles sensitive communications and can send any message securely to California. He will have no authority except to transmit messages.

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